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UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE REVISED
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT
Russell K. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 2011, Governor Gary R. Herbert signed into law S.B. 131, the
Unincorporated Business Entity Uniform Acts, which included a modified version
of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA). The modified
version of RULLCA included in S.B. 131 has been further modified in S.B. 211 to
make certain corrective and harmonized changes (the Proposed Act). It is the basic
premise of this Article that the Proposed Act will provide a number of valuable
improvements for businesses formed as limited liability companies (LLCs)
in Utah.
This Article begins with a brief history of the evolution of LLC acts. Next, it
reviews the current state of law relative to Utah LLCs, with a particular focus on
potentially problematic provisions in our existing LLC Act. It then provides a
general overview of certain provisions of the Proposed Act, paying particular
attention to problematic issues associated with Utah’s existing LLC Act.
II. EVOLUTION OF LLC ACTS
Since Wyoming passed the first LLC Act in 1977, the LLC has grown to be a
favored form of business entity, not only in Utah, but throughout the nation. By the
end of 1996, all of the states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted
LLC acts.
During the LLC “explosion” of the early 1990s, a working group of the
American Bar Association’s Committee on LLCs, Partnerships, and
Unincorporated Entities (LPUE) drafted and in 1992 published the Prototype
Limited Liability Company Act (the Prototype Act) to provide guidance for the
analysis and resolution of issues involved in crafting LLC legislation. Shortly
thereafter, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) began working on a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(ULLCA) and finalized an initial version in 1994. Both the Prototype Act and the
ULLCA were influential as various states drafted and modified their LLC acts, but
neither fully occupied the field. In addition to the Prototype Act and the ULLCA,
state legislative bodies have looked to NCCUSL’s Uniform Partnership Act and
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for guidance in connection with adopting and
amending their LLC acts. As a result, LLC acts vary considerably in both form and
substance from state to state.
* © 2013 Russell K. Smith. Reviewed by Mark Astling.
1
S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2013/
bills/static/SB0021.html (sponsored by L. Hillyard).
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On January 1, 1997, the Internal Revenue Service repealed its Kintner
regulations,2 which provided for classification of business entities as partnerships
or corporations for tax purposes based on the existence or lack thereof of certain
corporate characteristics (i.e., limited liability, centralized management, free
transferability of interest, and continuity of life), and replaced them with the
“check-the-box” regulations.3 Prior to the repeal of the Kintner regulations, many
LLC acts were drafted as so-called bulletproof statutes. Such bulletproof LLC acts
ensured that LLCs formed under them would always be classified as partnerships
for federal tax purposes, because any such LLC would always lack the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests.
In response to the adoption of the check-the-box regulations, the ULLCA was
revised and many states amended their LLC acts to remove the outdated provisions
relating to the Kintner regulations. In addition, as the LLC structure has grown to
become the favored form of business and investment entity, states have further
amended their LLC acts to deal with emerging issues such as single-member
LLCs, series within an LLC, shelf LLCs, subsidiary-style LLCs, and conversions
and domestications. For example, single-member LLCs, once suspect because of
their novelty and uncertain tax status, are now popular both for sole proprietorships
and as corporate subsidiaries.
As a result of the changing legal landscape, in the early 2000s, LPUE
undertook to update the Prototype Act and NCCUSL initiated a project to amend
and update the ULLCA. LPUE published the Revised Prototype Limited Liability
Company Act (the Revised Prototype Act) in the November 2011 issue of The
Business Lawyer.4 In 2006, NCCUSL approved and recommended the RULLCA
for enactment in all states. The members of the drafting committees of the
RULLCA and the Revised Prototype Act include practicing lawyers, judges,
legislators, and law professors who are some of the nation’s most knowledgeable
and well-versed experts in LLC issues and drafting legislation. Since the approval
of the RULLCA, NCCUSL has undertaken to harmonize the RULLCA and the
other unincorporated business entities statutes (i.e., the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA
(2001))). In 2011, NCCUSL approved and recommended for enactment in all
states the harmonized versions of RULLCA (HRULLCA), RUPA (HRUPA) and
ULPA (2001) (HULPA).

2

Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996)
(codified at Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (2012)).
3
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3. Widely known as the “check-the-box” regulations,
these regulations provide that most multiowner unincorporated business forms (including
multimember LLCs) will be taxed as partnerships, and single-owner unincorporated
business forms (including single-member LLCs) will be disregarded for tax purposes,
unless a specific election is made to have them taxed as corporations. Id.
4
Revised Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act Editorial Bd., LLCs, P’ships &
Unincorporated Entities Comm., Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Bus. Law, Revised Prototype
Limited Liability Company Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 117 (2011).
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III. UTAH’S LLC ACT
Utah enacted its first LLC statute in 1991 and, after several revisions, the
entire statute was replaced in 2001 with the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Company Act (the Current Act). The Current Act consists of provisions taken from
a variety of sources including the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the
Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the Utah LP Act), the Utah
Professional Corporation Act, the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act, the
Prototype Act, the ULLCA, and the LLC statutes of California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, Virginia, and
Washington. As a result, the Current Act is a hodge-podge statute unlike any other
LLC statute—indeed, one member of the ABA’s drafting committee for the
Revised Prototype Act has referred to it as a “Frankenstein” statute.5
In what is supposed to be a business-friendly state, Utah has an LLC statute
that has certain outdated and antibusiness features including: (1) limited life (i.e.,
no perpetual life), (2) a one-of-a-kind liquidation proceeds waterfall that penalizes
member-creditors and winding-up creditors by subordinating their claims to the
claims of other creditors, (3) statutory reformation of the members’ business deal if
not in a signed writing, which disproportionately disadvantages the unsophisticated
and unrepresented, (4) inflexible management structure and delegation of
authority, (5) limited member asset protection features, (6) default profit/loss
allocation and distribution rules that do not take into account “profits interests” and
which, in certain circumstances, will conflict with federal tax rules, and
(7) a default requirement for a unanimous vote on all matters to be decided by the
vote of the managers.
For purposes of this Article, whether an LLC statute is business friendly is
taken from the perspective of the LLC and its members and management, as
opposed to third parties doing business with the LLC (e.g., creditors). The
business-friendly definition includes such things as ease of formation, ongoing
compliance obligations, and giving maximum effect to the concept of freedom of
contract (i.e., the ability of individuals to make a legally binding agreement
without governmental interference).
A. LLC Duration Is Unnecessarily Limited to a Maximum of Ninety-Nine Years
While almost all LLC statutes now permit LLCs to have a perpetual existence
similar to that of corporations, the Current Act explicitly limits the duration of an
LLC formed under the Current Act to ninety-nine years from the date when the
LLC’s articles of organization were filed or the later of any amendments to the
articles of organization effecting a change in the duration.6 This durational limit is
an outdated remnant of the old Kintner regulations, and its sole function was
5

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UTAH LLC ACT (2011),
http://www.utahbar.org/cle/springconvention/materials/H_outline.pdf.
6
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-403(4)(c) (West Supp. 2012).
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intended to ensure that an LLC qualified for partnership tax treatment. In response
to the check-the-box regulations, most state LLC statutes were amended to permit
perpetual-duration LLCs. Utah has not modified its statute to reflect the evolution
in tax classification by the check-the-box regulations. In contrast, the Utah LP Act
was amended post-check-the-box regulations to remove this outdated limit on
duration and permit perpetual duration of limited partnerships.7 While the
members of an LLC may choose to have an LLC of limited duration, no sound
policy reason exists to statutorily limit the duration of LLCs.
B. Utah’s One-of-a-Kind Liquidation Proceeds Waterfall
Penalizes Member-Creditors and Winding-Up Creditors
by Subordinating Their Claims
Unlike any other LLC act, the Current Act penalizes member-creditors and
winding-up creditors by subordinating their claims to the claims of other creditors
during the liquidation and winding-up process. Such subordination is neither
warranted nor justified and runs contrary to other Utah creditor-rights statutes.
The Current Act, like other LLC acts, provides that a member of an LLC may
transact business with the LLC and, subject to such laws as may be applicable,
“shall have the rights and obligations with respect to any such matter as a person
who is not a member.”8 These provisions recognize not only that members of
LLCs often wear many different hats (e.g., creditor, lessor, guarantor, employee,
etc.), but also that members of LLCs frequently transact business with the LLCs,
and the members of the LLC should not be penalized for engaging in
such transactions.
A member may become a creditor of an LLC in a variety of ways. In practice,
members often (i) lend money (either secured or unsecured) to the LLC,
(ii) provide services to the LLC for which the member is to receive remuneration,
(iii) sell goods to the LLC on credit, (iv) receive indemnification payments from
the LLC, (v) pay LLC expenses on behalf of the LLC for which the member will
be reimbursed, and (vi) lease real or personal property to the LLC.
Each LLC statute establishes a priority of asset distribution in connection with
the winding up of an LLC’s business. Typically, an LLC’s assets are first applied
or set aside to satisfy an LLC’s obligations to creditors in the order of priority as
provided by law (i.e., first to secured creditors based on priority and then to
unsecured creditors based on priority). It is only after creditors have been paid or
otherwise provided for that any remaining assets are distributed to the members in
respect of their LLC interests.
Business-friendly LLC acts do not distinguish between nonmember-creditors
and member-creditors with respect to priority of liquidating distributions. The fact
that a person is a member does not alter any rights that such person may have as a
creditor. For example, the Delaware LLC Act provides that upon the winding up of
7
8

Id. § 48-2a-201(1)(d)(i).
Id. § 48-2c-119.
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a Delaware LLC, the LLC’s assets are to be distributed as follows: (1) to creditors,
including members and managers who are creditors, to the extent otherwise
permitted by law, in satisfaction of liabilities of the LLC, other than liabilities for
which reasonable provision for payment has been made and liabilities for interim
and resignation distributions to members and former members; (2) unless
otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, to members and former members in
satisfaction of liabilities for interim and resignation distributions; and (3)
thereafter, to the members.9
In contrast, the Current Act penalizes member-creditors by subordinating their
creditor interests behind nonmember-creditors in liquidation. Under the Current
Act, the assets of an LLC are to be applied or distributed as follows: (1) to pay or
satisfy the liabilities of creditors other than members, in the order of priority as
provided by law; (2) to pay or satisfy the liabilities to members in their capacity as
creditors, in the order of priority as provided by law; (3) to pay or satisfy the
expenses and costs of winding up the LLC; and (4) thereafter, to the members.10
This member-creditor subordination penalty, based solely on the grounds that the
creditor is a member, is neither warranted nor justified. In fact, this provision is
inconsistent with other Utah creditor-rights statutes including the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code11 and the Utah Real Estate Act,12 which provide for different
payment priorities.
The Current Act further confuses creditor rights with respect to expenses and
costs incurred as part of winding up an LLC. The Current Act creates a separate
class of creditors (the so-called winding-up creditors)—those to whom the
company owes the costs and expenses of winding up the LLC—and places this
class of creditors behind, rather than on par with or ahead of, all other creditors
(both nonmember- and member-creditors).13 Accordingly, nonmember-creditors
such as attorneys, accountants, and employees who assist in the winding up of the
LLC and suppliers and other consultants who provide goods and services during
the winding up period of an LLC may have their claims subordinated to all other
creditors. This provision of the Current Act is a disincentive to persons who might
otherwise provide goods and services to an LLC that is or might be winding up its
business. This is especially true in circumstances where the LLC may have
insufficient assets to pay all of its creditors. Furthermore, such subordination is
inconsistent with other Utah creditor-rights statutes.14
The Current Act has the dubious distinction of being the only LLC statute that
creates such an inequitable asset distribution waterfall. In contrast, the Utah LP Act
does not subordinate partner-creditor or winding-up-creditor claims.15 Rather, the
9

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308.
11
Id. §§ 70A-9a-101 to -709 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012).
12
Id. § 57-1-29 (West Supp. 2012).
13
Id. § 48-2c-1308(1).
14
See id. §§ 70A-9a-101 to -709 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); id. § 57-1-29 (West
Supp. 2012).
15
Id. § 48-2a-804 (West Supp. 2012).
10
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Utah LP Act uses the same basic liquidating distribution provision (i.e., first to
creditors including partner-creditors)16 used in states that have business-friendly
LLC acts such as Delaware,17 Texas,18 Nevada,19 and Virginia.20
As a word of caution, some practitioners have mistakenly attempted to opt-out
of the problematic statutory distribution provisions of the Current Act by including
alternative liquidation distribution provisions in a written operating agreement. In
fact, many Utah LLC operating agreements, either intentionally or inadvertently,
contain asset liquidation distribution provisions that purport to remove or alter the
statutory subordination of member-creditor and winding-up-creditor claims. In
spite of such proactive drafting, the Current Act nullifies any such modification of
the statutory distribution provisions without the consent of the nonmembercreditors. The Current Act specifically provides that a Utah LLC’s articles of
organization or operating agreement may not “restrict rights of . . . persons other
than the members, their assignees and transferees, the managers, and the [LLC],
without the consent of those persons.”21 Accordingly, the superior priority rights
granted to nonmember-creditors under the Current Act may not be restricted
without such nonmember-creditors’ consent. Therefore, an operating agreement
that purports to remove or alter the statutory subordination of member-creditor and
winding-up-creditor claims would be of no force or effect as to nonconsenting,
nonmember-creditors.
C. The Current Act Abandons Nearly a Century of Legislative History and
Disproportionately Disadvantages the Unsophisticated and Unrepresented by
Prohibiting Oral Operating Agreements
Unlike a majority of LLC acts, the Current Act superimposes a one-size-fitsall statutory set of business terms in place of informally agreed to business terms
that have not been memorialized in a written operating agreement. Not only does
this written requirement abandon nearly a century of legislative history during
which Utah has recognized both oral partnership agreements and oral operating
agreements, but it also leads to greater uncertainty and disproportionately
disadvantages the unsophisticated and unrepresented who are less likely to have
formal written operating agreements.
The requirement that an operating agreement be in writing is one of the most
potentially troublesome provisions of the Current Act. Ironically, it is also one of
the most misunderstood. The Current Act defines an “operating agreement” as “a
written agreement of the members . . . concerning the business or purpose of the
company and the conduct of its affairs.”22 The problem with the written
16

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005).
18
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 11.053 (West 2011).
19
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.521 (LexisNexis 2010).
20
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049 (2011).
21
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-120(1)(h).
22
Id. § 48-2c-102(16) (emphasis added).
17
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requirement is that it attempts to legislate a best practice while ignoring certain
realities. Stated differently, the issue is not whether oral agreements are
appropriate or whether operating agreements should be in writing—indeed, it
seems clear that the best practice is to always have members of an LLC
memorialize their business agreement in writing. Rather, the issue is whether an
operating agreement must be in writing.
Recognizing the reality of informal oral agreements, a significant majority of
jurisdictions,23 as well as the RULLCA24 and the Revised Prototype Act,25 permit
oral operating agreements. Like many of the jurisdictions that permit oral operating
23

The following jurisdictions permit oral operating agreements (either explicitly or by
not requiring a written operating agreement): Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.095 (2010)
(silent—no written requirement); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601(14) (Supp.
2011); California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 17001(ab) (West 2006); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-102(11) (2012); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-101(17) (West
Supp. 2012); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 2010); District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE § 29-801.02(10) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.402(24) (West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(18) (Supp. 2012);
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-101 (LexisNexis 2008) (silent—no written
requirement); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-102(15) (Supp. 2012); Illinois, 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5 (West 2010) (silent, except for single-member LLCs, which
must have written operating agreements unless they are managed by a person other than the
member); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-1-16 (LexisNexis 2010); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7663(g) (2007); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015(20) (West Supp.
2011) (except certain single-member LLCs); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1301(16) (Supp. 2012) (except single-member LLCs); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31,
§ 1502(15) (2011); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-402(b)(2) (West
Supp. 2012); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 2(9) (LexisNexis 2005);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.03(6) (West 2011) (silent—no written requirement);
Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-105(t) (Supp. 2011); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.015(13) (West 2001) (except single-member LLCs); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-102(23) (2011) (silent—no written requirement); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-102(14) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.101
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (no written requirement, but must be evidenced in tangible or
electronic format); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03(16) (2011); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02(8) (2012) (silent—no written requirement); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1705.01(J) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (except single-member LLCs);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001(16) (West 2012); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.001(25) (2011); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8916 (West Supp. 2012);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(21) (Supp. 2011); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-44-103(a) (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-101(12) (2007);
Texas, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.001(1) (West Supp. 2012); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(15) (2012) (no written requirement, but must be evidenced in tangible
or electronic format); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1023 (Supp. 2012); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-1-103 (LexisNexis 2009); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-29-102(xiv) (2011).
24
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(13) (2006).
25
REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(14) (2011).
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agreements, Utah has a long history of recognizing oral agreements for both
partnerships and limited liability companies. Ever since Utah codified the thencommon law with respect to general partnerships by its adoption of the Uniform
Partnership Act (1917) in 1921,26 Utah has permitted oral partnership
agreements.27 Utah’s recognition of oral partnership agreements was expanded to
limited partnerships in 1990 with the adoption of the Utah Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act,28 which explicitly states that a partnership agreement may
be “written or oral.”29 Utah then permitted oral operating agreements for LLCs30
when it enacted its first LLC statute, the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, in
1991.31 It was not until 2001 with the adoption of the Current Act32 that operating
agreements were first required to be in writing.33 Given the broad acceptance of
oral agreements as well as Utah’s present and historical recognition of such
agreements, there is no legitimate reason for the now-disparate treatment with
respect to Utah LLCs.
The writing requirement disproportionately disadvantages unsophisticated
individuals and persons who are not represented by legal counsel. A large
percentage of LLCs (roughly estimated to be between 50–60%)34 are formed by
nonlawyers, including accountants, filing services, and unsophisticated individuals.
The LLCs these parties form are less likely to have a written operating agreement.
Sophisticated or well-advised parties, on the other hand, are much more likely to
have a written operating agreement. Accordingly, the class of persons who need
the most protection will benefit most by permitting oral operating agreements.
The Current Act replaces often integral and essential business terms that have
not been memorialized in a written operating agreement with a one-size-fits-all
statutory set of business terms. This replacement of informally agreed-to business
terms with completely unrelated business terms runs the risk of distorting or even
destroying the original intent of the parties. An example of such distortion or
destruction is readily apparent in LLCs with no written operating agreement and
so-called service members. Service members are persons who are granted equity in
exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC. A popular method of
26

Uniform Partnership Act, ch. 89, 1921 Utah Laws 253 (codified at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 48-1-1 to -48).
27
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-3, -4, -13 (silent—no written requirement).
28
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, ch. 233, 1990 Utah Laws 1126 (codified
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2a-101 to -1107).
29
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2a-101(10).
30
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (LexisNexis Supp. 2000) (repealed 2001) (silent—
no written requirement).
31
Utah Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 258, 1991 Utah Laws 991
(repealed 2001).
32
Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 260, 2001 Utah Laws 1213
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-101 to -1902).
33
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-102(16).
34
Percentage range is based on NCCUSL’s anecdotal, nonscientific survey of filing
officers in the various states that have enacted or are studying the RULLCA.
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providing equity-based compensation to LLC service members, including
founders, is the granting of a “profits interest.”35 However, a member who receives
a profits interest in exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC does not
receive credit to his capital account for the value of such services. Since the
Current Act’s default rules for current distributions,36 voting,37 profit/loss
allocations,38 and liquidating distributions39 are all based upon the members’
capital account balances, a service member under such default rules would have
nothing—no right to current distributions, no voting percentage interest, no receipt
of allocation of profits or losses, and no participation in a liquidating distribution.
Therefore, if not memorialized in a written operating agreement, the default rules
of the Current Act would override every business deal involving a service member
receiving a profits interest, thereby distorting or destroying the original intent of
the parties.
Given the potential for extreme inequity resulting from the parties’ distorted
or destroyed intent, it is likely that a court faced with such a dilemma would use its
equitable powers based on either a theory of unjust enrichment or detrimental
reliance to try to achieve some sort of equitable solution. The court’s exercise of its
equitable powers may result in an outcome still different from the original intent of
the parties and could therefore lead to even greater uncertainty for the parties
involved.
Permitting oral agreements will result in greater certainty. Businesses want
certainty that the business deal to which the parties have agreed will be followed—
whether that deal is oral, written, or otherwise. Certainty as to a particular
outcome, while important, is not as important as certainty that the right or correct
outcome will occur (i.e., the terms accurately reflect the parties’ intentions). In
contrast, the writing requirement actually results in less certainty in that the
intended business terms are irrelevant in the absence of a written agreement and,
subject to the court’s equitable gerrymandering, are replaced with statutory default
35

A profits interest is an equity-based form of compensation that allows a member to
share in the future economic appreciation of the value of an LLC but does not provide the
member with an interest in the current value of an LLC. If the profits interest is structured
to meet certain Internal Revenue Service requirements, the granting of the profits interest
will not be a taxable event. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
36
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1001 (“[C]urrent distributions shall be allocated among
the members in proportion to the members’ capital account balance as of the beginning of
the company’s current fiscal year.”).
37
Id. § 48-2c-704(10) (“[V]oting at a meeting [of the members] shall be determined
by percentage interests in the profits of the company . . . .”).
38
Id. § 48-2c-906 (“[P]rofits and losses shall be allocated in proportion to the
members’ capital account balances as of the beginning of the company’s current
fiscal year.”).
39
Id. § 48-2c-1308(2) (“Company assets remaining . . . shall be allocated and
distributed . . . in accordance with the members’ final capital account balances after
allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses accrued or incurred during
winding up.”).
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terms which may be completely different (for all parties) from the intended
business deal.
Also, permitting oral operating agreements is not likely to result in more
litigation. Anecdotally, in the almost one hundred years that Utah has had a
codified partnership statute that has permitted oral agreements, Utah’s courts have
not been overwhelmed with oral partnership litigation matters. Therefore, why
should permitting oral operating agreements result in significantly more litigation?
The argument that litigation will increase is based solely on the assumption that the
party alleging oral terms, when apprised of the statutory requirement that the
operating agreement must be in writing, will pack up and go home or otherwise be
dissuaded from bringing suit. This is not a reasonable assumption, especially, as
noted above, if the party alleging oral terms can bring action under theories of
unjust enrichment and detrimental reliance.
Finally, from a public policy perspective, in a business-friendly state, the
policy should be to defer to the business deal agreed upon by the parties, whether
that agreement is in writing or not. A business-friendly state should fall back to
default statutory terms only as a last resort when the parties have either not
considered or not agreed upon a specific term. If a party can prove the existence of
agreed-upon terms, the State should not interfere or interject statutory business
terms wholly unrelated to a business deal. A policy of deferring to the actual
business deal not only adds much needed certainty, but also does not
disproportionately disadvantage unsophisticated or unrepresented parties who are
more likely to have oral agreements.
D. The Current Act’s Outdated Application of Statutory Apparent Authority
Unnecessarily Decreases Management Flexibility
The Current Act unnecessarily restricts the often-touted advantage of LLCs
having a potentially infinite variety of management structures to two statutorily
predetermined structures (i.e., manager-managed or member-managed).40
Furthermore, the Current Act statutorily confers actual and apparent authority to
members and managers in the above two paradigms regardless of the intentions of
the parties.41
As stated above, one of the benefits of the LLC structure is its flexible
management structure. An LLC’s management (i.e., those who have the authority
to manage the affairs of the LLC and the legal power to bind the LLC) can be
structured in any way the members choose. In contrast, the management structures
of general partnerships, limited partnerships, and corporations are statutorily
dictated and less flexible. For example, an LLC’s management structure can be
made to resemble the management structure of other entities.42 An LLC’s
40

Id. § 48-2c-403(1)(f)–(g).
Id. § 48-2c-802.
42
For LLCs with a general partnership-type management structure, all of the
members have the right to participate in managing the LLC and are agents with the power
41
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management structure is not, however, just limited to those resembling other
entities’ management structures; it can be custom-tailored to meet the needs and
desires of the LLC’s members.
Notwithstanding this supposed flexibility, the Current Act requires that the
LLC publicly select between two statutorily preordained structures (i.e., managermanaged or member-managed)43 and then links statutory power to bind to the
selected structures.44 This concept of statutory apparent authority by position (i.e.,
each member in a member-managed LLC, and each manager in a managermanaged LLC has apparent authority to act on behalf of and bind the LLC in the
ordinary course of business) dates back at least to the original 1914 Uniform
Partnership Act.45 Since then, the concept of statutory apparent authority based on
position has found its way into the various uniform partnership and limited liability
company acts.
The “position” concept of statutory apparent authority makes sense for both
general and limited partnerships, but not for LLCs. Both types of partnerships have
well-defined, well-known, predictable, and almost paradigmatic management
structures. A third party dealing with either type of partnership can know by the
formal name of the partnership and by the person’s status as general or limited
partner whether the person has power to bind the partnership. The concept of
statutory apparent authority does not, however, make sense with respect to LLCs
because an LLC’s name gives no indication as to its management structure and,
more importantly, because an LLC may use an almost infinite variety of
management structures.
Statutory apparent authority causes problems when the members of an LLC
do not extend actual authority to every manager in a manager-managed LLC or
every member in a member-managed LLC. For example, the members may want a
corporate, board-style management structure where the board of managers is
intended to operate as a group, and no single manager acting alone has actual
authority to act on behalf of the LLC. In such instances, the Current Act frustrates
the intended management structure by providing that each manager has statutory
apparent authority to act on behalf of and bind the LLC in the ordinary course of
the LLC’s business. Even if an LLC has a written operating agreement that
provides for a board-style management structure, a manager may, without actual
authority, bind the LLC in the ordinary course of business if a third party does not
know or does not otherwise have actual or constructive notice that the manager
lacks authority.46 Under the Current Act, limitations on a manager’s or member’s
to bind the LLC. Alternatively, for LLCs with a limited partnership-type management
structures, fewer than all of the members participate in managing the LLC and are agents
with the power to bind the LLC. Finally, for LLCs with a corporation-type management
structure, a board and officers manage the LLC, with no board member acting alone having
the power to bind the LLC.
43
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-403(1)(f)–(g).
44
Id. § 48-2c-802.
45
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9 (amended 1997).
46
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-802.
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statutory apparent authority must be set forth in an LLC’s articles of
organization.47 In contrast, the Delaware LLC Act,48 the RULLCA,49 and the
Revised Prototype Act50 each depart from the statutory apparent authority model
found under the legacy LLC statutes, including the Current Act.
The Delaware LLC Act provides in part: “Unless otherwise provided in [an
operating] agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the
[LLC].”51 As such, the Delaware LLC Act does not vest statutory apparent
authority in a person or persons based on the type of management structure
adopted by the LLC (i.e., member-managed or manager-managed); instead, it puts
all third parties on notice that no member or manager has statutory apparent
authority to bind the LLC. One commentator summarized the practical application
of this section with the following anecdote: “[W]hen the man says, ‘I can do
anything unless my wife says I may not,’ I question anyone’s ability to rely upon
him without her there to confirm he may act.”52 Just as a third-party would check
with the man’s wife in the anecdote, so must third parties look to a Delaware
LLC’s operating agreement to determine whether a person purporting to have
authority has authority to engage in the particular act.
RULLCA section 301(a) expressly provides that members have no statutory
apparent authority.53 Furthermore, by its silence (i.e., no specific statutory
authority granted), managers of a manager-managed LLC also do not have
statutory apparent authority. The Revised Prototype Act goes even further and
provides that no person shall have the power to bind the LLC except to the extent
that such person is authorized in the LLC operating agreement, by the members in
a duly filed statement of authority, or as provided by law.54 The following
introductory comment to the Revised Prototype Act describes the ABA’s reason
for the elimination of the manager-managed and member-managed dichotomy and
statutory actual and apparent authority:
The [Revised Prototype] Act changes significantly the original Prototype
Act in that it eliminates the member-managed and manager-managed
bifurcation of management structures and the statutorily conferred actual
and apparent authority of members and managers in those paradigms.
Instead, the [Revised Prototype] Act provides that a person’s actual or
apparent authority to bind the limited liability company will be
47

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005).
49
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (2006).
50
REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301 (2011).
51
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402.
52
Thomas E. Rutledge & Steven G. Frost, RULLCA Section 301—The Fortunate
Consequences (and Continuing Questions) of Distinguishing Apparent Agency and
Decisional Authority, 64 BUS. LAW. 37, 46 n.48 (2008) (citation omitted).
53
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (“A member is not an agent of [an
LLC] solely by reason of being a member.”).
54
REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301.
48
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determined with reference to the limited liability company agreement,
decisions of the members in accordance with the limited liability
company agreement or the default rules of the [Revised Prototype] Act, a
statement of authority, or law other than the [Revised Prototype] Act
such as the common law of agency. This approach allows drafters to
provide for managers, officers, boards of directors, and other forms of
governance that were difficult if not impossible to accomplish under the
original Prototype Act [or other legacy LLC Acts].55
LLC acts that do not base statutory apparent authority on position do not
impose a significantly greater burden on third parties—contracting or otherwise—
doing business with LLCs (e.g., banks and title insurance companies) to make sure
that the person with whom they are dealing has authority. Under the Current Act,
third parties without knowledge to the contrary are entitled to rely on a Utah LLC’s
filings with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code (i.e., articles of
organization and annual report) for purposes of determining authority. While
checking applicable filings has the benefits of speed and simplicity, it also runs the
risk of inaccuracy. In the absence of statutory apparent authority, however, the due
diligence of a third party doing business with an LLC is not substantially different
from what third parties must do when conducting business with a corporation (i.e.,
review charter documents and obtain secretary and incumbency certificates). In
addition, some state LLC acts that do not have statutory apparent authority provide
for the filing of statements of authority as a means of providing evidence of
authority of a position, office, or person to enter into transactions.56 Such
statements of authority serve as notice of who does or does not have authority to
act for and bind the LLC. In addition, such statements of authority provide the
same benefits of speed and simplicity found under the Current Act. Therefore,
because the necessary due diligence performed in the absence of statutory apparent
authority is substantially the same as what is already performed for corporations,
and since filed statements of authority provide evidence of actual authority, LLC
acts without statutory apparent authority do not impose a significantly greater
burden on third parties.
The increasingly outdated concept of statutory apparent authority by position
in LLCs decreases management flexibility and is therefore less business-friendly.
The elimination of statutory apparent authority will provide greater management
flexibility, and therefore a more pro-business statute, by permitting LLCs to
(i) adopt an almost infinite variety of management structures (as opposed to the
two statutorily predetermined structures set forth in the Current Act), and
(ii) determine which persons, positions, or offices have actual authority to bind the
55

Revised Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act Editorial Bd., supra note 4, at 119–20.
E.g., D.C. CODE § 29-803.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30172(d) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-302 (Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.302(3) (West Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1542 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 21-127 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-302 (2011).
56
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LLC without authority being statutorily endowed. Furthermore, this greater
flexibility is achieved without imposing a significantly greater burden on third
parties doing business with the LLC.
E. Members Have Limited Asset Protection Because
Foreclosures on LLC Interests Are Permitted
Unlike many LLC statutes that limit a creditor’s right against a debtormember’s LLC interest to a charging order, the Current Act permits foreclosure
thereby depriving members of Utah LLCs of a potentially valuable asset protection
tool.57 Furthermore, the Current Act requires, as a condition precedent to ordering
foreclosure, that a creditor make a showing that distributions under the charging
order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable time, thus inadequately
balancing the rights of both creditors and debtors.
An important aspect of the law of unincorporated business organizations (i.e.,
partnerships and LLCs) is the “pick your partner” principle. Most, if not all, LLC
statutes provide that, subject to certain limited exceptions, a transferee of an LLC
interest is not automatically admitted as a member of the LLC. LLC statutes often
require express consent of the existing members for admission of a new member.
An extension of the “pick your partner” principle is the use of charging
orders, in lieu of foreclosure and liquidation, as a creditor remedy to satisfy a
member’s personal debts. Charging orders operate much like garnishments and
require an LLC to pay to a debtor-member’s creditor amounts that otherwise would
be distributed to the debtor-member until the debt is satisfied or otherwise
discharged. A charging order constitutes a lien on a debtor-member’s LLC interest.
Once the liability has been satisfied, either with distributions from the LLC or
otherwise, the charging order terminates, and the rights to receive distributions
with respect to the LLC interest are fully restored to the debtor-member.
Importantly, a creditor with a charging order does not become a member of the
LLC and, accordingly, has no voting or management rights in the LLC.
Many LLC acts limit a creditor’s right against a debtor-member’s LLC
interest to a charging order.58 Such states are viewed as friendly toward LLC

57

UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012).
In several states a charging order is the exclusive remedy by which a member’s
judgment creditor may satisfy a judgment out of the member’s LLC interest. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 10A-5-6.05 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.380 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29-655 (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.433 (West Supp. 2012) (excluding single-member LLCs); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11504 (Supp. 2012) (except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written
operating agreement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,113 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§ 1573; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4507 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.32 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-703 (West 1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86-401 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-45 (West 2004);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2034 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-504 (2007);
58
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members because they preclude a creditor from foreclosing on a debtor-member’s
LLC interest. For example, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides,
“The entry of a charging order is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment
creditor of a member or of a member’s assignee may satisfy a judgment out of the
judgment debtor’s limited liability company interest.”59 Some states, in addition to
providing that a charging order is the exclusive remedy, expressly preclude
foreclosure.60 Nevada, for example, states that:
[A charging order is] the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor
of a member or an assignee of a member may satisfy a judgment out of
the member’s interest of the judgment debtor, whether the limitedliability company has one member or more than one member. No other
remedy, including, without limitation, foreclosure on the member’s
interest or a court order for directions, accounts and inquiries that the
debtor or member might have made, is available to the judgment creditor
attempting to satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor’s interest
in the limited-liability company, and no other remedy may be ordered by
a court.61
In contrast, the Current Act takes a “liquidation approach” pursuant to which
a creditor can foreclose on the debtor-member’s LLC interest and receive
permanent economic rights in the LLC interest, including rights to distributions
from the LLC after the member’s debt has been satisfied.62 Under the Current Act,
a court may order foreclosure of an interest in a Utah LLC subject to a charging
order at any time.63 Unlike certain other states that expressly permit foreclosure on
a debtor-member’s interest, the Current Act does not require a showing by the
creditor that the distributions under the charging order will fail to pay the judgment
debt within a reasonable time before ordering foreclosure.64 While the most proTENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-509 (Supp. 2011); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.112
(West Supp. 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503.
59
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(d).
60
The following states expressly preclude foreclosure: Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.380(c); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-504(b) (except as otherwise provided in
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 1573(7); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4507(5)–(6); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.401(2)(a); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-45; Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2034; South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-504(e);
Texas, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.112(c); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.11041.1(E) (2011); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503(g).
61
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-401(2)(a) (emphasis added). Almost identical language
is found in the Wyoming LLC Act. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503(g).
62
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b).
63
Id.
64
The following jurisdictions permit foreclosure only after a showing that the
distributions under a charging order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable
time: District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 29-805.03(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Florida,

2013]

UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF RULLCA

27

business approach would be to expressly prohibit foreclosure altogether, permitted
foreclosure—only upon a showing that distributions will not pay the judgment debt
within a reasonable time—at least requires the court to balance the rights of the
member and the creditor and is more pro-business than permitted foreclosure at
any time without any such showing.
The liquidation approach set forth in the Current Act (i.e., permitting
foreclosure without any showing) not only deprives members of Utah LLCs of a
potentially valuable asset protection tool, but, without such a showing requirement,
it also lacks a condition precedent that is intended to balance the rights of both
creditors and debtors. Accordingly, legal practitioners and entrepreneurs often cite
Utah’s liquidation approach as a factor in favor of choosing to form an LLC
outside Utah.65
F. Default Economic Rules Conflict with Federal Tax Law
and Do Not Account for “Profits Interest”
The Current Act’s default rules for profit and loss allocations and distributions
may result in profit and loss allocations that do not comply with applicable federal
tax rules. In addition, these same default rules when combined with the default rule
for voting do not allow for profits-interest members.
The default rules in the Current Act for current distributions,66 profit/loss
allocations,67 liquidating distributions,68 and voting69 are each based upon the
members’ capital account balances. However, a member’s capital account is
defined in the Current Act as follows:
“Capital account,” unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement,
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the
company for each member to reflect:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.433(6) (West Supp. 2012) (with respect to single-member LLCs);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-503(3) (Supp. 2012); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.503(3) (West 2009); and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2654(4) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011).
65
For example, sophisticated estate planning and asset protection attorneys will often
elect to form LLCs for their Utah clients in neighboring Nevada or Wyoming.
66
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1001 (“[C]urrent distributions shall be allocated among
the members in proportion to the members’ capital account balance as of the beginning of
the company’s current fiscal year.”).
67
Id. § 48-2c-906 (“[P]rofits and losses shall be allocated in proportion to the
members’ capital account balances as of the beginning of the company’s current
fiscal year.”).
68
Id. § 48-2c-1308(2) (“Company assets remaining after [dissolution and winding up]
. . . shall be allocated and distributed . . . in accordance with the members’ final capital
account balances after allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses
accrued or incurred during winding up.”).
69
Id. § 48-2c-704(10) (“[V]oting at a meeting [of the members] shall be determined
by percentage interest in the profits of the company . . . .”).
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(a) the value of all contributions by that member;
(b) the amount of all distributions to that member or the
member’s assignee;
(c) the member’s share of profits, gains, and losses of the
company; and
(d) the member’s share of the net assets of the company upon
dissolution and winding up that are distributable to the member or the
member’s assignee.70
In addition, the Current Act provides that, except as otherwise provided in the
articles of organization or operating agreement, the capital accounts of the
members shall be adjusted to reflect the revaluation of the company assets upon
the occurrence of certain events (i.e., greater than de minimis capital contribution
or distribution, dissolution and winding up of the company, a merger of the
company, or the grant of a greater than de minimis profits interest).71
It seems clear from the language of sections 48-2c-102(3) and 48-2c-903 that
the authors of the Current Act were trying to incorporate the federal income tax
concept of a capital account. The Treasury regulations, however, take several
pages to define a capital account and describe its maintenance while the Current
Act takes fewer than 350 words. Accordingly, there are scenarios where a capital
account for federal income tax purposes will be different than a capital account
determined under the default rules of the Current Act.
When such differences do occur, what allocation rules (i.e., federal tax or
Current Act) should LLCs follow? To try and resolve this question, it is important
to remember that the Internal Revenue Service may alter the members’ allocations
if such allocations do not have substantial economic effect and if the term “capital
account” (as defined in the Treasury regulations) is used to make that
determination.
Since federal law (i.e., the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury
regulations) will ultimately determine a member’s share of profits and losses for
tax purposes, why then is it necessary to have a default rule in the Current Act for
allocating profits and losses? The ULLCA, the ULPA (2001), the RULLCA, and
the Revised Prototype Act omit any default rule for allocation of profits and losses.
The Comment to section 503 of the ULPA (2001) explains the rationale for the
omission as follows:
This Act has no provision allocating profits and losses among the
partners. Instead, the Act directly apportions the right to receive
distributions. Nearly all limited partnerships will choose to allocate
profits and losses in order to comply with applicable tax, accounting and

70
71

Id. § 48-2c-102(3).
Id. § 48-2c-903(1)(c).
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other regulatory requirements. Those requirements, rather than the Act,
are the proper source for guidance for the profit and loss allocation.72
Furthermore, basing default rules for profit and loss allocations, distributions,
and voting percentage interests on capital account balances does not provide
allowance for profits-interest members. As noted above, a member who receives a
profits interest in exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC does not
receive credit to his capital account for the value of such services. Accordingly,
under the black-letter law reading of the default rules in the Current Act, a profitsinterest member would have no capital account, no right to current distributions, no
voting percentage interest, would receive no allocation of profits or losses, and
would not participate in a liquidating distribution. To allow for the recognition of
profits-interest members, the default rules should be based on something other than
the members’ capital accounts (regardless of whether defined as set forth in the
Treasury regulations or in the Current Act) or the members’ capital contributions.73
Therefore, the application of the Current Act’s default rules for profit and loss
allocations, distributions, and voting percentage interests (a) do not provide
allowance for profits-interest members and (b) may result in profit and loss
allocations that do not comply with applicable federal tax rules.
G. The Current Act Fails to Set a Default Rule for
How a Vote of the Managers Decides Matters
The Current Act fails to have a default rule for how a vote of managers
decides matters in a multi-manager, manager-managed LLC. Having to apply a
unanimous voting standard in the absence of a contrary standard is antibusiness
because inherent in such standard is the potential for deadlock and abuse.
The Current Act only contains a default rule for deciding matters without a
meeting, without prior notice, and without a vote.74 Absent from the Current Act is
how a vote of the managers is to decide matters. Because there is no default rule
for deciding matters by a vote, to be safe, unless a written operating agreement or
articles of organization provide for an alternative voting standard, any matter to be
decided by a vote of the managers should be decided by a unanimous vote. Failure
72

UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 503 cmt. (2001); see also REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 404 cmt. (2006).
73
The default rules of RULLCA provide that (a) with respect to nonliquidating
distributions, such distributions are to be made in equal shares, see REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CORP. ACT § 404(a); (b) with respect to liquidating distributions, such distributions are to
be made first to return capital and then in equal shares, see id. § 708(b); and (c) with
respect to management, decisions are either made unanimously or by a majority (in
number) of the members, see id. § 407(b)(3)–(5), (c)(4)–(5).
74
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-808 provides that “on any matter that is to be voted on
by the managers . . . [they] may take action without a meeting, without prior notice, and
without a vote, if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, is signed by all of
the managers . . . .”
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to obtain the unanimous vote of the managers as to a particular matter—when the
LLC’s articles of organization or operating agreement provide no alternative
voting standard—would leave the particular matter subject to a potential challenge
for not having been properly or duly authorized.
Once again Utah is in the minority; a large majority of states provide
complete default rules for how managers decide matters, whether by vote or
consent.75 For example, the California LLC Act provides, “Except as otherwise
provided in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, . . . decisions of
the managers shall be made by majority vote of the managers if at a meeting, or by
unanimous written consent.”76
Furthermore, a unanimous vote standard, which as noted above should be
used in the absence of a default rule, is an antagonistic business standard.
Unanimity inherently has the potential for deadlock, wherein the managers cannot
all agree and thus the LLC’s business is prevented from moving forward without
judicial or third-party intervention. Unanimity also provides fertile ground for
more nefarious conduct. For example, one or more managers could hold an LLC,
the other managers, and even the members hostage to extort some unmerited
75

The following states have a manager voting default rule: Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.150(b) (2010); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(B), (D), (E) (Supp.
2012); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403(a) (2001); California, CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17156 (West 2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(1) (2012); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-142(a) (West 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4231(6)
(West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-11-308(a)(2) (2003); Hawaii, HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 428-404(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2008); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6407(3)(c) (Supp. 2012); Illinois, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1(b)(2) (West 2010);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-3(b) (West 2010); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.407.3(c) (West Supp. 2012); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.175(1) (West
2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1316 (2010); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 156C, § 26(d) (LexisNexis 2012); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 450.4405(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.653 (West
2004); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-401(7) (2011); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.079(4) (West 2012); Montana, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-8-307(2)(b) (2011); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:33(V) (2005); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-17(B)(3) (2012); New York, N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 408(b) (McKinney Supp.
2012); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20(b) (2011); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-32-83 (2012); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. 18 § 2018 (West 2012); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 63.130(2)(b) (2011); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8942(a)
(West Supp. 2012); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-19 (Supp. 2011); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-404(b)(2) (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A404.1(b)(2) (2007)); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-239-112(c) (West 2010); Texas,
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.355 (West Supp. 2012); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11 § 3054(b)(2) (West 2010); Virginia, VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-1024(G) (2011);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.165(1) (West Supp. 2011); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-4-404(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 183.0404(1)(b) (West 2002); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29407(c)(iii) (2011).
76
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17156.
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benefit. Accordingly, the application of the unanimous vote standard as a default
rule is decidedly antibusiness. In contrast, recognizing the potential for deadlock
and abuse as well as the resulting negative effects on business, all of the
state LLC acts that have a manager voting default rule employ the “majority
vote”77 standard.78
The failure of the Current Act to include a default rule for how matters are
decided by the vote of managers results in the application of the antagonistic
business standard of a unanimous vote of the managers. Such a standard is higher
than the standard all states that have a manager voting default rule apply and
exposes LLCs to potential manager deadlock and abuse.
IV. UTAH’S REVISED UNIFORM LLC ACT
Since NCCUSL adopted the ULLCA in 1994, there have been significant
developments related to LLCs, which were noted in the introduction. The
RULLCA was drafted with these developments in mind. The members of the
drafting committees of the RULLCA included practicing lawyers, judges,
legislators, and law professors who are some of the nation’s most knowledgeable
and well-versed experts in LLC issues and drafting legislation. In addition to the
members of NCCUSL’s drafting committee, ABA members nationally recognized
as experts with respect to LLCs and representing several different ABA sections79
served as advisors to the RULLCA drafting committee. The RULLCA was drafted
in terms that are consistent with other commercial law statutes, such as RUPA and
ULPA (2001). In fact, the harmonized versions of these acts have a similar look
and feel. To date, Iowa,80 Nebraska,81 Wyoming,82 Idaho,83 Utah,84 District of
Columbia,85 and California86 have adopted the RULLCA, and Kansas,87
Minnesota,88 and New Jersey89 have introduced legislation to adopt the RULLCA.

77

The “majority vote” standard is the vote of a majority of the managers on a per
capita basis.
78
See statutes cited supra note 75.
79
The ABA sections represented included (i) ABA Business Law Section, (ii) ABA
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, and (iii) ABA Tax Section.
80
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 489.101–.1304.
81
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-101 to -197 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
82
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105 (Supp. 2012).
83
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-101 to -1104 (Supp. 2012).
84
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-3-101 to -1405 (West Supp. 2012) (effective July 1, 2013).
85
D.C. CODE §§ 29-801.01 to -810.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
86
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.
419, at 3967–4055 (West).
87
H.B. 2261, 2011 Sess. (Kan. 2011) (sponsored by Lance Kinzer). H.B. 2261 died in
the Committee on Judiciary on June 1, 2012.
88
H.B. 1274, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011) (sponsored by Doug Wardlow).
89
S.B. 742, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (sponsored by Paul A. Sarlo).
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The Proposed Act,90 while based on the HRULLCA, incorporates certain
Utah-specific provisions: (a) the existing election to purchase in lieu of dissolution
provision in the Current Act91 that permits an LLC or its members to purchase the
interest of the member who has sought judicial dissolution of the LLC for
oppressive, harmful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by the managers or control
members;92 (b) an updated version of the existing professional LLC provisions of
the Current Act;93 (c) an updated version of the Current Act’s series LLC
provisions;94 (d) the existing low-profit limited liability company provisions;95 and
(e) a change to the standard courts apply when considering whether to invalidate
operating agreement provisions that address fiduciary duty and other sensitive
matters from “manifestly unreasonable”96 to a more predictable and businessfriendly “unconscionable or against public policy” standard.97
In very general terms, the Proposed Act is more detailed, more up-to-date, and
more business friendly than the Current Act. The following sections will note
significant provisions of the Proposed Act, paying particular attention to how the
Proposed Act addresses the previously identified problems in the Current Act.
A. The Proposed Act’s Structure Has the Same Look and Feel
as Other Uniform Statutes
The structure of the Proposed Act closely resembles that of the RUPA, the
ULLCA, and the ULPA (2001).98 Using a common and familiar structure has
many advantages over Utah’s existing one-of-a-kind LLC Act. These advantages
include (a) consistency and uniformity with Utah’s and other states’ uniform
business statutes, (b) similar terminology and concepts that appear in other modern
business and commercial statutes, (c) ease in finding and locating provisions, and
(d) ease in identifying differences between similar statutes.
With the adoption of the Proposed Act as well as the Utah-specific versions of
the HRUPA and HULPA, each of Utah’s unincorporated business statutes will
have uniform provisions with a similar look and feel. For example, formation,
charging order, derivative proceedings, foreign admission, and organic change
provisions (e.g., mergers) in the Proposed Act mirror similar provisions in the Utah
versions of the HRUPA and HULPA. This uniformity will result in greater

90

S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1214 (West Supp. 2012).
92
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-702.
93
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-1501 to -1513; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1101 to -1112.
94
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-606 to -616; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1201 to -1209.
95
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1301 to -1304.
96
HARMONIZED REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 105(c)(6), (d)(3), (e) (2011).
97
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(3)(f), (4)(c), (5).
98
Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 519 (2007) (discussing
RULLCA upon which the structure of the HRULLCA and the Proposed Act are based).
91
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predictability as to what these statutes say and as to how Utah’s courts will
interpret them.
B. The Proposed Act Permits Perpetual Life LLCs
The Proposed Act removes the long-outdated provision of the Current Act
that explicitly limits the duration of LLCs.99 Instead, the Proposed Act specifically
provides that an LLC has perpetual life100 unless another duration is set forth in the
LLC’s operating agreement.101
C. Operating Agreements Become the Foundational Document and May Be Oral
The Proposed Act defines “operating agreement” very broadly: “[An]
agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral,
implied, in a record, or in any combination thereof, of all the members of a limited
liability company, including a sole member, concerning the matters described in
Subsection 48-3a-112(1).”102 The operating agreement may consist of a number of
separate documents (or records), however denominated, unless the operating
agreement itself provides otherwise.103 Under the Proposed Act, the operating
agreement is the LLC’s foundational document104 even though formation of a Utah
LLC pursuant to this statute will require the filing of a certificate of organization
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.105 As such, a conflict
between an LLC’s operating agreement and its certificate of organization is
generally resolved in favor of the LLC’s operating agreement.106 This is a shift
toward those states, including Delaware, which have certificates of organization or
formation that only evidence the formation or existence of the LLC and contain
only minimal information.107 For example, the Proposed Act requires that only the
name of the LLC, address of the principal office of the LLC, and registered agent
information be set forth in the certificate of organization.108 The Proposed Act
requires neither a statement as to how the LLC is managed nor the names and
addresses of the members or managers. Therefore, instead of spreading
management and other business provisions among an LLC’s articles of
organization and operating agreement as required by the Current Act, under the
Proposed Act, all such provisions will be located in the operating agreement.

99

See supra Part III.A.
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-104(3).
101
Id. § 48-3a-112(1).
102
Id. § 48-3a-102(16) (emphasis added).
103
Id. § 48-3a-112(1)(d).
104
Id. § 48-3a-112(1).
105
Id. § 48-3a-201.
106
Id. § 48-3a-114(4).
107
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 (2005 & Supp. 2010).
108
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-201(2).
100
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Having all of the business terms in one document will lead to greater consistency
and efficiencies.
As noted above, the Proposed Act’s definition of an operating agreement
specifically permits oral agreements, thus avoiding the problems inherent in the
Current Act’s writing requirement.109 This does not mean written agreements are
not advisable. It merely recognizes the reality of informal business relationships
and does not impose a statutory formality, where the failure to comply may result
in a statutorily imposed business deal entirely unrelated to the actual business deal
the members agreed upon.
While the Proposed Act would permit the contents of an operating agreement
to be established by written or spoken words, conduct, or some combination
thereof, written operating agreements with integrated contract and written
amendment provisions would minimize the potential that prior oral agreements or
conduct and oral amendments to written operating agreements would be upheld.110
The purpose of an integrated contract provision is to prevent the parties to a written
agreement from later claiming that they had an agreement that was different from
their written agreement, that the written agreement does not reflect their entire
understanding, or that the written agreement is not consistent with prior
agreements or conduct of the parties. With respect to an operating agreement with
an integrated contract provision, any previous negotiations or agreements in which
the members had considered different terms will be deemed superseded by the
final written operating agreement. Such integration provisions are enforceable
under Utah contract law.111 A written amendment provision is language included in
a contract that provides that amendments to the contract must be in writing. 112
109

See supra Part III.C.
An integrated contract provision is language included in a contract that declares
the contract to be the complete and final agreement between the parties. The following is
an example of an integrated contract provision: “This Agreement, along with any exhibits,
appendices, addendums, schedules, and amendments hereto, encompasses the entire
agreement of the parties, and supersedes all previous understandings and agreements
between the parties, whether oral or written. The parties hereby acknowledge and represent
that said parties have not relied on any representation, assertion, guarantee, warranty,
collateral contract, or other assurance, except those set out in this Agreement, made by or
on behalf of any other party or any other person or entity whatsoever, prior to the execution
of this Agreement. The parties hereby waive all rights and remedies, at law or in equity,
arising or which may arise as the result of a party’s reliance on such representation,
assertion, guarantee, warranty, collateral contract, or other assurance, provided that nothing
herein contained shall be construed as a restriction or limitation of said party’s right to
remedies associated with the gross negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud of any person
or party taking place prior to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of this
Agreement.”
111
See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008) (“[I]n the
face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not
admissible on the question of integration.”)
112
The following is an example of a written amendment provision: “This Agreement
may only be amended by a written document duly executed by all parties.”
110
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While the Proposed Act does not specifically authorize an operating agreement to
limit the means by which it may be amended (e.g., modifications must be in a
signed writing), section 48-3a-112(1)(d) does provide that the operating agreement
governs “the means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.” 113
Furthermore, the comments to the RULLCA with respect to this section
specifically state that this section “could be read to encompass such
authorization.”114 Therefore, oral agreements are permitted, thereby avoiding the
problems inherent in the Current Act’s writing requirements. But given the broad
number of potential sources from which the contents of an operating agreement
can be established, written operating agreements with both an integrated contract
provision and a written amendment provision should be used to maximize
certainty.
D. Members Are Permitted Greater Latitude in Defining, Altering,
and Eliminating Fiduciary Duties—Increased Freedom of Contract
As compared to the Current Act, the Proposed Act provides greater latitude to
owners in structuring their business deals (i.e., freedom of contract) and is
therefore more business friendly. In doing so, the Proposed Act fairly balances
public policy concerns regarding the contractual obligation of good faith and fair
dealing with the extent to which owners may alter and eliminate fiduciary duties.
Historically, the law of “fiduciary duty in unincorporated business
organizations was mostly a matter of case law.”115 As stated in the comments to the
RULLCA, “Until the promulgation of RUPA, it was almost axiomatic that:
(i) fiduciary duties reflect judge-made law; and (ii) statutory formulations can
express some of that law but do not exhaustively codify it.”116 While the original
UPA followed this approach, RUPA took a radically different approach and sought
to exhaustively codify all fiduciary duties relevant to a RUPA partnership and its
partners.117 The principal reason for this new approach was to “‘cabin in’ fiduciary
duties so as to protect partnership agreements from judicial second guessing.” 118
This cabin-in approach was followed by both the ULLCA and the ULPA (2001).119
The RULLCA and the Proposed Act take a different approach. The RULLCA
drafting committee determined, after careful consideration, that “the ‘cabin in’

113

S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(1)(d).
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(a)(4) cmt (2006).
115
Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 98, at 522.
116
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt.
117
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 1 (1997) (“Section 404 is both
comprehensive and exhaustive.”). Section 404(a) provides, “The only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).” Id. § 404(a).
118
Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 98, at 522 .
119
UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408 (2001); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a) (1996).
114
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approach creates more problems than it solves.”120 The cabin-in approach ignores
the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties such as the duty of controlling
members to not oppress fellow members, and puts an inordinate amount of
pressure on the concept of “good faith and fair dealing.”121 The RULLCA drafting
committee also determined a better way to protect the operating agreement from
judicial second-guessing: (i) “[I]ncrease and clarify the power of the operating
agreement to define and re-shape fiduciary duties (including the power to eliminate
aspects of fiduciary duties),”122 and (ii) “provide some guidance to the courts when
a person seeks to” invalidate a provision of an operating agreement on the grounds
that the provision is, under the RULLCA, “manifestly unreasonable.”123
Accordingly, RULLCA incorporated into its provisions such powers and
guidance.124
The Proposed Act continues the Current Act’s “uncabined” approach, but
with some improvements. The Current Act codifies both the duty of care125 and the
duty of loyalty,126 but it does not contain language limiting or cabining the
fiduciary duties to just these codified duties. The Proposed Act improves upon the
Current Act’s approach by (a) providing in detail the extent to which the operating
agreement can define, alter, or eliminate aspects of fiduciary duty;127 (b) expressly
limiting the ability to “relieve or exonerate a person from liability for conduct
involving bad faith, willful misconduct, or recklessness;”128 and (c) providing
120

REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT , prefatory note; see also David Walker, Chair
of Drafting Comm., Remarks at the Third Session of Proceedings in the Committee of the
Whole Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 8, 2006) (transcript available at National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (“We have, we say, ‘uncabined’
fiduciary duties.”).
121
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note; see also Daniel Kleinberger,
Co-Reporter of Drafting Comm. Remarks at the Fourth Session of Proceedings in the
Committee of the Whole Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 8, 2006) (transcript available
at National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (“[W]e are already
seeing pressure in the courts on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. When you say there
are no other fiduciary duties and courts for hundreds of years have looked to fiduciary
duties as a policing mechanism that they can develop, if you say you can’t have fiduciary
duties, they will go to good faith. And, in fact, I had a conversation with [a] judge in . . .
North Carolina . . . . The judge of North Carolina’s business courts said, if you stop us on
fiduciary duty, we will just go to good faith.”).
122
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note.
123
Id. However, in lieu of the “manifestly unreasonable” standard used in the
RULLCA, the Proposed Act has the more judicially predictable “unconscionable or against
public policy” standard. S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 48-3a-112(3)(f) (Utah 2012).
124
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110; S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112.
125
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-807(1) (West Supp. 2012).
126
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-807(2).
127
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(4)(c)(i).
128
Id. § 48-3a-112(3)(g).
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specific guidance to courts asked to invalidate an operating agreement provision on
the grounds that the provision is “unconscionable or against public policy.” 129
These provisions are more business-friendly than the Current Act, in that it grants
greater latitude to owners in structuring their business deals while balancing public
policy concerns regarding the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing
and the alteration or elimination of fiduciary duties.
E. Members Have Greater Flexibility in Determining an LLC’s Management
Structure with the Elimination of Statutory Apparent Authority
The Proposed Act recognizes that “statutory apparent authority” is an attribute
of partnership formality that does not belong in an LLC statute.130 Accordingly, the
Proposed Act has eliminated the statutory link between the management structure
and apparent authority. Thus, whether a member, manager, or some other person
has power to bind an LLC becomes a matter of agency law.
The Proposed Act expressly provides that members have no statutory
apparent authority.131 Furthermore, by its silence (i.e., no specific statutory
authority granted), managers of a manager-managed LLC also do not have
statutory apparent authority. The following commentary, under the RULLCA, will
apply to the Proposed Act:
The actual authority of an LLC’s manager or managers is a question of
agency law and depends on the contents of the operating agreement and
any separate management contract between the LLC and its manager or
managers. These agreements are the primary source of the manifestations
of the LLC (as principal) from which a manager (as agent) will form the
reasonable beliefs that delimit the scope of the manager’s actual
authority.132
The comments to sections 301 and 407 of the RULLCA provide additional
guidance analyzing in detail how agency law will function in the absence of
statutory apparent authority.133
Eliminating statutory apparent authority also eliminates the need to have an
LLC publicly indicate in its certificate of organization the LLC’s management
129

Id. § 48-3a-112(5).
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note (2006); see supra Part III.D.
131
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-301(1) (“A member is not an agent of [an LLC] solely by reason
of being a member.”).
132
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c) cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 3.01 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 15, 26 (1958).
133
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 301 cmt., 407 cmt. (analyzing in detail how
agency law will function in the absence of statutory apparent authority, including, in the
context of a multimember, member-managed, or multimanager, manager-managed LLC
with an operating agreement that is silent as to how management responsibility is to be
allocated between or among them).
130
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structure. However, an LLC might want to make, or a third-party may require, as a
condition to the business relationship or transaction, that the LLC make a public
filing of its management structure. The Proposed Act addresses this issue by
providing for the filing of statements of authority.134 Section 48-3a-302(1) of the
Proposed Act permits such a statement of authority to designate authority of a
specific person or by position or office (e.g., president, chief executive officer,
etc.). A filed statement of authority will enable an LLC “to provide evidence of
ongoing authority to enter into transactions without having to disclose to third
parties the entirety of the operating agreement.”135
By removing the outdated concept of statutory apparent authority by position,
the Proposed Act provides greater management flexibility to adopt an almost
infinite variety of management structures and determine which persons, positions,
or offices have actual authority to bind the LLC. In addition, by providing for the
filing of statements of authority, third parties will continue to have the convenience
and ability to rely on filing evidence of authority.
F. The Proposed Act Contains a Default Governance Rule
for Managers Missing from the Current Act
The Proposed Act includes a default rule for how a vote of the managers
decides matters. The Proposed Act provides that “any matter relating to the
activities and affairs of the limited liability company is decided exclusively by the
manager, or, if there is more than one manager, by a majority of the managers.” 136
This important default rule is conspicuously missing from the Current Act.137
G. The Proposed Act Contains Foreclosure Provisions That Better Balance
the Rights of Debtor-Members and Judgment Creditors
Like the Current Act, the Proposed Act does not limit the remedy available to
a member’s judgment creditor to only a charging order.138 Both the Current Act
and the Proposed Act permit a court to foreclose on a charging order and sell the
charged LLC interest.139 Accordingly, both statutes are more pro-creditor than
those state LLC statutes that provide a charging order as the exclusive remedy.
However, because the Proposed Act contains both a showing requirement140 and
grants limited power to the court to make other orders giving effect to a charging
order, the Proposed Act is more pro-business than the Current Act and better
balances the rights of both debtor-members and judgment creditors.

134

S.B. 21 § 48-3a-302(1); see supra Part III.D.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 302(a)(2) cmt.
136
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-407(3)(a).
137
See supra Part III.G.
138
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3); see supra Part III.E.
139
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012); S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3).
140
See supra Part III.E.
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While the Current Act permits a court to foreclose at any time,141 the
Proposed Act requires a showing by the judgment creditor “that distributions under
a charging order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable time” before a
court may foreclose and order the sale of the LLC interest.142 As noted above,
requiring such a showing is a way for the court to balance the rights of the debtormember and the creditor and is more pro-business. Also, the Current Act grants the
court broad discretionary powers to “make all other orders, directions, accounts,
and inquiries a judgment debtor might make or that the circumstances of the case
may require.”143 Such a broad grant of unfettered authority is an unwelcome
invitation for the courts to meddle in the internal affairs of an LLC. In contrast, the
Proposed Act’s grant of power to the court to make other orders is limited to
“giv[ing] effect to the charging order.”144 This limited grant prevents the court
from interfering in the internal affairs of the LLC. For example, if a judgment
creditor who believes the LLC should invest less of its surplus in operations in
order to leave more funds available for distributions has a charging order and
makes a motion for a court order directing the LLC to restrict reinvestment, section
48-3-503(2)(b) of the Proposed Act does not authorize the court to grant
such a motion.145
Even though foreclosure is permitted under both the Proposed Act and the
Current Act, because of the showing requirement and the limited grant of power to
the court to make other orders to give effect to a charging order, the Proposed Act
is more pro-business and better balances the rights of both the debtor-member and
the judgment creditor.
H. The Proposed Act Does Not Penalize Member-Creditors
and Winding-Up Creditors in Liquidation
The Proposed Act eliminates both the member-creditor penalty and the
winding-up-creditor penalty imposed by the Current Act wherein such creditors’
claims are subordinated.146 Instead, the Proposed Act simply provides that “[i]n
winding up its activities, [an LLC] shall apply its assets to discharge its obligations
to creditors, including members that are creditors.”147 The Proposed Act recognizes
that no ordering or priority of the payment of creditor claims is necessary
since such ordering and priority is already determined pursuant to other
applicable law.148
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b).
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3); see supra Part III.E.
143
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(1)(d) (emphasis added).
144
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(2)(b).
145
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 503(b)(2) cmt (2006).
146
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308(1); see supra Part III.B.
147
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-711(1).
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308(1).
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I. The Proposed Act Contains Comprehensive Provisions for Mergers, Interest
Exchanges, Conversions, and Domestications
Unlike the Current Act, which deals only with conversions and mergers,149 the
Proposed Act includes comprehensive provisions for mergers, interest exchanges,
conversions, and domestications.150 Under the Proposed Act, a set of provisions
governs each type of organic change. These provisions are not only internally
consistent with one another, but are also consistent with the organic change
provisions of the Utah-specific versions of the HRUPA and HULPA.151
Also, the Proposed Act corrects a problem in the Current Act with respect to
conversions. The Current Act inadequately deals with “outbound” conversions
(i.e., the conversion of the Utah LLC into a foreign entity) in that it is unclear
what, if anything, the LLC must file in Utah in connection with such a
conversion.152 The confusion arises from the wording of section 48-2c-1406(4) of
the Current Act, which states:
(4) A conversion of a domestic [LLC] into a foreign subject entity
must be:
(a) permitted by the statutes governing the foreign subject entity;
(b) approved in the manner required by the statutes described in
Subsection (4)(a); and
(c) accompanied by any filing in the foreign jurisdiction required by
the statutes described in Subsection (4)(a).153
Nowhere in section 48-2c-1406(4) is a filing with a Utah governmental entity
explicitly required. Instead, the wording provides that an outbound conversion
must be “accompanied” by a filing in the foreign jurisdiction. Not only is the
wording confusing, but it also seems to imply that the conversion only needs to
have the filing required in the foreign jurisdiction and not in Utah. If this is the
case, how is Utah to be informed of an outbound conversion when the only filing
is the filing in the foreign jurisdiction? The author, when confronted with this exact
issue involving the conversion of a Utah LLC into a Delaware LLC, raised the
issue with Kathy Berg, the Director of the Utah Division of Corporations and
Uniform Commercial Code. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Berg agreed to accept
for filing a letter indicating that an outbound conversion had taken place when
accompanied by a copy of the conversion filing from the foreign jurisdiction.154
The organic transaction provisions of the Proposed Act not only eliminate the
confusion found in the Current Act, but also provide clear and comprehensive
149

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-1401 to -1411.
S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1001 to -1056.
151
See supra Part IV.A.
152
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1406(4).
153
Id. (emphasis added).
154
Telephone Interview with Kathy Berg, Director, Div. of Corps. & Unif.
Commercial Code, Utah Dep’t of Commerce (Oct. 13, 2009).
150
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statutory guidance with respect to effecting such organic transactions and the
resulting consequences thereof.
J. The Proposed Act Includes Enhanced Series LLC Provisions,
Which Increase the Likelihood that Bankruptcy Courts and Nonseries Jurisdictions
Will Respect a Series
Given the uncertainty surrounding series LLCs (“SLLCs”), the Proposed Act
contains specific provisions not found in the Current Act that increase the
likelihood that bankruptcy courts and nonseries jurisdictions will respect the
existence of a series separate from the master LLC and each of the other series.155
The SLLC is a form of LLC that partitions its assets and members into one or
more separate “series” or “cells,” each of which can have separately designated
members and managers and can own its own assets separately from the assets of
the LLC or any other series. The liabilities of each series will be enforceable only
against the assets of that series. Delaware enacted the first SLLC statute in 1996.156
Since that time, Iowa,157 Oklahoma,158 Illinois,159 Nevada,160 Tennessee,161 Utah,162
Texas,163 and Kansas164 have passed SLLC legislation. At least three other states
(Minnesota,165 North Dakota,166 and Wisconsin167) provide for a “series” of
ownership interests but do not provide creditor protection as between each series.
It is important to note that the drafters of the RULLCA considered but ultimately
rejected the idea of including SLLC provisions in the RULLCA.168 The drafters
noted conceptual concerns, bankruptcy issues, series treatment in states without
SLLCs, tax treatment, and securities law issues.169
Given the lack of judicial, statutory, and administrative guidance, several
open issues continue to plague SLLCs, including uncertainties surrounding the

155

S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. §§ 48-3a-1201 to -1209 (Utah 2012).
Act of June 10, 1996, ch. 360, 70 Del. Laws 360 (1996) (codified at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2005)).
157
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.305 (West 1999) (superseded by IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.1201 (West 2009) (effective Jan. 1, 2009)).
158
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2054.4 (West 2012).
159
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (West 2010).
160
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.296 (Lexis-Nexis 2010).
161
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (Supp. 2011).
162
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-606 to -616 (West Supp. 2012).
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TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.601 to .621 (West 2012).
164
Substitute for H.R. 2207, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (to be codified at KAN.
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interaction of the series structure with tax,170 securities,171 and bankruptcy172 laws
and the laws of nonseries jurisdictions.173 Most of the uncertainty surrounds
whether bankruptcy courts and nonseries jurisdictions will respect the
“separateness” of each series. In other words, will a series be treated as separate
from the master LLC and each of the other series as to liabilities, purpose, power
to sue or be sued, ownership of property, and otherwise, or will the existence of a
series be disregarded?
While the merits of having an SLLC statute in Utah are debatable, because the
Current Act already has SLLC provisions,174 omitting SLLC provisions in the
Proposed Act is not a viable option (i.e., the proverbial genie cannot be put back in
the bottle). In light of the continuing uncertainty regarding SLLC, however, the
Proposed Act’s SLLC provisions substantially improve those in the Current Act.
Certain aspects of these provisions should be favorable factors in determining the
“separateness” of each series and whether bankruptcy courts and non-SLLC states
will respect liability protection of each series.
The SLLC provisions in the Current Act,175 like those of Nevada, Oklahoma,
and Kansas, closely follow the original Delaware statute. In contrast, the Illinois
and Iowa176 SLLC provisions, while clearly influenced by the original Delaware
statute, contain additional provisions that are designed to further the separateness
of each series. It is these additional provisions that have been incorporated into the
Proposed Act.

170

One of the key uncertainties involves the classification and treatment of SLLCs
under U.S. federal tax law. On September 14, 2010, the Internal Revenue Service
attempted to address this particular area of uncertainty by issuing Proposed Treasury
Regulation §§ 301.6011-6, 301.6071-2 and 301.7701-1(a)(5) (the Proposed Regulations)
which address some, but not all, of these tax issues. Series LLCs and Cell Companies, 75
Fed. Reg. 44699 (proposed Sept. 13, 2010). Basically, the Proposed Regulations provide
that each series of an SLLC will be evaluated under the so-called check-the-box entity
classification regulations as a separate entity and may make any federal tax election it is
otherwise eligible to make independently of the SLLC or any other series. Id.
171
The uncertainty is whether the issuer of securities is only one particular series or
instead the entire SLLC for purposes of registration, exemptions from registration, offering
integration, and disclosure requirements of federal securities laws.
172
The uncertainty is how the bankruptcy courts will react to an SLLC when faced
with the following issues: (i) whether a series may be a debtor for bankruptcy purposes and
make a separate bankruptcy filing, and (ii) whether a bankruptcy court will uphold series
liability shields.
173
The uncertainty is whether nonseries jurisdictions will recognize the series
concept.
174
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-606 to -616 (West Supp. 2012).
175
See S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 48-3-a-112(3)(g) (Utah 2012).
176
IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.1201 (West 2009) (effective January 1, 2009, incorporated
as part of Iowa’s adoption of the RULLCA).
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For example, unlike the other states, Illinois and Iowa explicitly define a
series within an SLLC as a “separate [legal] entity.”177 This language separates
Illinois and Iowa from the previous Delaware statute and its progenitors, including
the Current Act, because the Illinois and Iowa LLC acts do not provide that each
series is its own legal entity that is distinct from the original LLC. The Proposed
Act includes a similar provision.178
In addition, Illinois and Iowa provide that “the provisions of this [LLC] Act
which are generally applicable to limited liability companies, their managers,
members and transferees shall be applicable to each particular series.”179 This
phrase is significant, and although absent from the original Delaware statute and
the Current Act, it has been included in the Proposed Act.180 A court in a state
without a series LLC statute may be more apt to treat the series like a simple LLC
where, as in the Illinois and Iowa statutes and under the Proposed Act, the statute
explicitly commands it.
Also absent from the original Delaware statute and the Current Act is a
provision similar to that found in the Illinois statute and the Proposed Act, which
provides that each series is to be treated as a separate entity that may “contract,
hold title to assets, grant security interests, sue and be sued and otherwise conduct
business and exercise the powers of a limited liability company.” 181 This omission
from the Delaware statute led one commentator to believe that the statute simply
provides a way to segregate assets, not to separately own them.182

177

805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(b) (West 2010) (“A series . . . [is] treated as
a separate entity to the extent set forth in the articles of organization.”); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.1201(3) (“A series meeting all of the conditions of subsection 2 shall be treated as a
separate entity to the extent set forth in the certificate of organization.”).
178
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-1201(3)(a) (proposing that a series that meets all of the conditions
of subsection (2) shall “be treated as a separate entity to the extent set forth in the
certificate of organization”).
179
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(j) (emphasis added); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 489.1201(7) (“Except to the extent modified by this article, the provisions of this chapter
which are generally applicable to a limited liability company, and its managers, members
and transferees, shall be applicable to each series with respect to the operations of such
series.” (emphasis added)).
180
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-1201(6) (“Except to the extent modified by this part, the
provisions of this chapter which are generally applicable to a limited liability company, and
its managers, members and transferees, shall be applicable to each series with respect to
the operations of such series.” (emphasis added)).
181
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(b); S.B. 21 § 48-3a-1201(3) (“A series
meeting all of the conditions of Subsection (2) shall . . . have the power and capacity to, in
its own name, contract, hold title to property, grant liens and security interests, and sue
and be sued.” (emphasis added)).
182
John C. Murray, A Real Estate Practitioner’s Guide to Delaware Series LLCs
(With Form) (2007), available at http://local.firstam.com/ekcms/uploadedFiles/firstam_
com/References/Reference_Articles/John_C_Murray_Reference/Limited_Liability_Compa
nies/jm-delaware.pdf.
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In GxG Management LLC v. Young Brothers and Co.183—the first reported
decision involving a Delaware SLLC—the court held that the statute did “not
indicate what capacity an LLC has to pursue litigation on behalf of its series, . . .
what capacity a series of an LLC has, if any, to pursue litigation on its own behalf,
or . . . whether it should be regarded as an entity distinct from the LLC from which
it is carved.”184 The court further noted, when denying a motion to amend
judgment, that the relationship between a Delaware LLC and its series “merely
[creates] a ‘series of interest’ maintained by the LLC.”185
Following GxG Management, the Delaware legislature amended the LLC
statute to rectify the belief that a series LLC only has an interest in (not ownership
of) its assets.186 The new provision explicitly states that a series can hold title to
assets in its own name.187 Furthermore, the capacity to sue and be sued, questioned
by the court in GxG Management and other commentators, was clearly granted in
the amended Delaware statute. Explicitly defining a series as a separate legal entity
was not, however, added to the Delaware statute.
Another significant addition in the Illinois LLC Act and Proposed Act is a
provision providing for better notice to third parties that they are dealing with an
SLLC. For example, the Illinois statute and the Proposed Act require the name of
the series to contain the name of the SLLC and that it be distinguishable from the
names of the other series.188 The Current Act has no such requirement. Therefore,
if an SLLC includes the company name with the particular series behind it, a
potential creditor performing reasonable due diligence should be on notice to
inquire about a series and what makes a series different or separate from the main
company name.
While Delaware amended its statute to deal with some of the issues that
commentators and the court in GxG Management exposed, Utah has not amended
the Current Act. Accordingly, SLLCs under the Current Act are at a greater risk of
losing series liability protection in bankruptcy and by non-SLLC states than
SLLCs formed under or governed by the Proposed Act.
The following Illinois-type provisions, which are absent in the Current Act,
have been incorporated into the Proposed Act: (a) a series is to be treated as a
“separate entity”;189 (b) a series has “the power and capacity, in its own name, to
183

No. 05-162-B-K, 2007 WL 551761 (D. Me. Feb. 21, 2007).
Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
185
GxG Mgmt. LLC v. Young Bros. & Co., No. 05-162-B-K, 2007 WL 1702872, at
*1 (D. Me. June 11, 2007) (order denying motion to amend judgment).
186
The Delaware series provisions were amended in 2007 (effective August 1, 2007).
Act of July 10, 2007, ch. 105, 76 Del. Laws 124 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18215 (West Supp. 2010)).
187
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (“Assets associated with a series may be held
directly or indirectly, including in the name of such series, in the name of the limited
liability company, through a nominee or otherwise.”).
188
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(c) (West 2010); S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen.
Sess. § 48-3a-1201(1) (Utah 2012).
189
S.B. 21 § 48-3a-1201(3)(a).
184
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hold property and sue and be sued”;190 (c) “the provisions of [the Proposed Act]
which are generally applicable to [LLCs], and its managers, members and
transferees, shall be applicable to each series”;191 and (d) a requirement that “[t]he
name of each series must contain the name of the [SLLC] and be distinguishable
from the name of any other series.”192 Even with these clarifying provisions in the
Proposed Act, significant uncertainty will continue regarding SLLCs for the
foreseeable future. However, the incorporation of these Illinois-type provisions
into the Proposed Act should assist bankruptcy courts and non-SLLC states in
determining whether to respect the separate existence, including liability
protection, of each series.
K. The Proposed Act Includes Low-Profit LLCs
The low-profit LLC provisions from the Current Act193 are incorporated into
the Proposed Act as Part 13, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies.194
L. The Proposed Act Eliminates Default Rules for Profit and Loss Allocations
The Proposed Act eliminates the use of the tax term “capital account” and the
default rules regarding profit and loss allocations used in the Current Act.195 The
Proposed Act recognizes that there are scenarios where a capital account for
federal income tax purposes will be different than a capital account determined
under the default rules of the Current Act. The Proposed Act also recognizes that
federal tax laws will ultimately determine a member’s share of profits and losses
for tax purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Proposed Act offers a number of advantages over the Current Act. The
Current Act is an outdated one-of-a-kind statute that is a patchwork of other
commercial statutes that do not mesh well. It has significant inconsistencies and is
decidedly less business-friendly than the Proposed Act. It is time for the Utah
legislature to enact an LLC statute that (1) represents the best thinking of some of
the nation’s foremost experts on LLCs and LLC legislation, (2) is drafted while
taking into account recent developments and national trends, (3) offers the benefits
of uniformity and consistency with Utah’s other unincorporated business entity
statutes as well as with other states’ unincorporated business entity statutes, and
(4) conveys the message that Utah is a pro-business state.
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